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he indefinite prorogation of the 
WTO’s Doha trade talks in July 
suggests that the global appetite 
for multilateralism may now be 
seriously weakened. This Policy Brief 
look at how a failed or significantly 
delayed Doha round (say till 2009 at 
the earliest) could affect the scope and 
structure of any eventual WTO deal. In 
particular, if a rise in regionalism in 
the interim is inevitable, they ask 
whether the EU should reassess its 
regional trade policy objectives? A 
move from a multilateral focus to a 
twinned regional-multilateral trade 
policy stance will have consequences, 
both for practical reasons of EC 
‘institutional capacity’ and for 
strategic reasons, in terms of choice of 
partner/s. Either way, tough decisions 
will have to be made. Wherever 
possible, the authors argue that these 
tactical choices should be preceded by 
careful technical analysis of the choice 
of regional partners and trading 
groups, as well as on traditional 
‘diplomatic’ methods of trade partner 
selection.  
The Doha & Multilateralism 
After nearly five years of negotiations, 
the WTO’s stumbling Doha round of 
trade negotiations was placed in 
indefinite suspension on July 24th after 
last-ditch talks in Geneva involving the 
six core negotiators – India, Brazil, the 
US, EU, Japan and Australia – 
collapsed over irreconcilable 
differences, chiefly on agricultural trade 
liberalisation. 
As the White House’s authority from 
the US Congress to negotiate trade 
deals expires next year, the end of July 
was in effect a deadline for a WTO deal 
on agricultural goods, services and 
manufactures by 2007. 
Consequently, many US experts and 
officials now consider Congress 
unlikely to renew that authority. So 
concluding any agreement in the 
foreseeable future now seems much less 
likely. Indeed, it may well be several 
years before a renewed consensus 
among the WTO’s now-149 member 
countries can be found to revive it. 
The collapse – or strictly speaking 
prorogation – of the WTO talks 
suggests that the enthusiasm for 
multilateralism, and even the world 
economic order, may be diminishing. It 
is therefore now an open question 
whether the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) can be speedily revived and/or 
whether the very legitimacy of the 
WTO itself may even be under threat.  
This note however seeks to investigate a 
slightly different issue: namely, if a 
Doha agreement is now likely to either 
fail or be significantly postponed (say 
till 2009 at the earliest), in what ways 
will the world’s trading arena be likely 
to change in the interim: possibly 
affecting the scope and structure of any 
eventual WTO deal.  
As has been documented elsewhere 
(Kernohan, 2006) if the ingredients for 
a successful round were more-or-less in 
place, what was crucially missing was 
the high-level political will to conclude 
a deal among the world’s major capitals 
and stakeholders. While much 
discussion is presently taking place on a 
status quo ante basis – as nature abhors 
a vacuum – the likelihood is that the 
world’s geo-political climate in 2009 
will diverge sharply from that of early 
summer 2007. In short, things will have 
moved on.  
The leading twentieth century 
economist John Maynard Keynes 
famously stated that when ‘the facts’ of 
international relations change, previous 
thinking must rapidly be adapted to 
accommodate them. 
Are we at a turning point…? 
It seems highly probable that we are 
now at some sort of turning point in 
international commercial affairs, with 
an apparent weakening in the appetite 
for ‘globalisation’ even among senior 
international policy-makers, planners 
and strategists as witnessed, for 
example, by a recent seminar at the 
Federal Reserve’s annual retreat at 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming (see Briscoe & 
Guha, 2006).  
Of course, concerns about the downside 
of globalisation’s have long been voiced 
in the NGO and anti-globalising 
fraternity. But what is now new is its 
emergence into ‘mainstream thinking’, 
as led by an increasingly vociferous and 
often distinguished body of thought, 
and echoed in recent UNCTAD 
thinking on development policy.
1  
If such thinking, commonplace in 
mainstream development circles for 
many years, can best be described as 
                                                  
1 And, for example, a recent Carnegie paper on 
the fallout from Doha and employment 
prospects (see Polaski, 2006).  
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neo-protectionist;
2 it is worth pointing 
out that trade and globalisation are not 
as closely associated in practice as 
many appear to believe.
3  
First, globalisation, properly 
understood, involves concerns for the 
mobility of ‘factors of production’ 
capital and labour; as well as the 
mobility of goods & services (aka 
international trade).
4  
Second, we need to draw a clear 
distinction between ‘trade’ itself and 
‘trade policy’, since actual trade 
patterns tend to increase between 
countries regardless of any political 
appetite for globalisation or 
multilateralism at the level of trade 
policy. 
Thirdly, since globalisation is not 
restricted to trade matters, any 
weakening of support for 
multilateralism and the WTO needs 
ideally to be accompanied by a careful 
review of the facts and theory of what is 
likely to occur in a world of increased 
regional integration.  
For the evidence suggests not only that 
regionalism is likely to enjoy a rapid 
revival, but also that it is likely to take 
pronouncedly different forms as the 
world’s two leading brokers of regional 
deals place different interpretations on 
their respective regional interests.  
Trade policy ruptures? 
The suspension of Doha illustrates a 
weakening in adhesion, if not outright 
rupture, in US/EU world views on 
multilateralism as much as the lack of 
appetite among large developing 
countries (e.g. India, Brazil) to add to 
the confusion and isolation of the 
                                                  
2 And it should be added, at least in the 
populist polemic, ‘pro aid’. 
3 In fact, the poorest countries will not have to 
open their domestic markets, under the WTO 
negotiations. Hence, Ghanian chicken farmers 
will not be victimised – as some famous 
protesters at the IMF’s Singapore meeting are 
currently asserting and under the EU’s 
Everything but Arms (EBA) agreement from 
2009 will have unilateral access to EU 
markets, giving no reciprocal access in return. 
4 The affection with which most economists 
view international trade arises from the 
theoretical assertion that, even without 
mobility of labour and capital, trade in 
goods/services alone is in theory capable of 
bringing about at least some degree of 
convergence of national incomes, as well as a 
rise in world welfare. 
world’s poorest nations, often referred 
to as the ‘G90 group’ in trade 
negotiation parlance.  
Sadly, as is now dawning on some of 
the formerly most fervent anti-trade 
NGOs, it is probably those poorest 
countries, which had already gained 
little from the previous rush for markets 
during the last decade of relative world 
prosperity, that will now miss out on 
potential benefits from the stalled Doha 
‘development’ round, especially if we 
are entering a less benign period of 
world economic fortunes.  
Yet, if we look at the broad spectrum of 
EU/US views on:  
•  the importance of a WTO deal, 
•  the causes of any negotiating failure, 
•  ways out of the present impasse and 
•  the sufficiency of regionalism, 
we see a systematic divergence across 
almost all of these vital questions.
5 In 
the EU also, commercial and trade 
policy is also at a turning point. This 
can be seen by the recent implied 
relaxation of the so-called ‘Lamy 
doctrine’, under Commissioner 
Mandelson. This held that no new 
RTAs would be launched while the 
Doha round was under negotiation. 
Hence in both the US and EU, the 
policy dynamics are now almost certain 
to lead towards increased regionalism or 
bilateralism, as the thinking is already 
advanced as to which select country 
(FTA) or regional  partners 
(RTA)should be first in line for 
attention.
6 
Of course, much diplomatic effort will 
now be devoted to a WTO resuscitation 
agenda: after all what otherwise are the 
respective trade bureaucrats to do? 
However, it may be legitimate to ask if 
this is the time to pour old wine into 
                                                  
5 A stylised view of the present US polemic 
might be as follows:‘trade is not a core policy 
area, especially in  the light of US job 
destruction and the primacy of agricultural 
concerns; the EU is to blame for not going far 
enough on domestic farm reform; there is no 
way out till a new administration and mandate 
are forthcoming after 2009; and anyway 
regionalism can do a sufficient job in the 
absence of a multilateral deal’.   
6 For the US it is an ambitious expansion of 
the former APEC scheme (excluding 
perceived WTO recalcitrants Brazil and India); 
for the EU it is likely to be South Korea, India 
or other points east. 
new bottles without taking a pause to 
reflect on the likely consequences of 
long-term WTO failure? 
Moreover, while the technocrats on all 
sides (who, after all, brought us to the 
present Doha negotiation impasse) will 
naturally wish to proceed as before, due 
consideration must also be given to the 
now-unavoidable costs of delay (or 
worse, losing the round entirely). Social 
scientists now recognise the central 
importance of intervening events (in the 
form of what is termed ‘path-
dependency’ or ‘hysteresis’) on the 
likely shape and scope of any eventual 
trade deal.
7 
We would argue that it is now time to 
take stock, and that assessments and 
prioritisation of EU trade policy should 
not now proceed by simple 
extrapolations from past practice, often 
based simply on precedent and 
institutional capacity rather than careful 
analysis.
8  
The point is that things change. It took 
both the EU and US working closely 
together to devise and launch the Doha 
round in 2001. To avert the strong 
possibility that both the EU and US 
continue to come up with different 
answers to similar questions on the 
ideal prescriptions for the direction of 
future trade policy, an emphasis is now 
needed on technical research into the 
design, sequencing and timing of trade 
and economic cooperation agreements, 
taking account of recent developments 
in the understanding of path-
dependency of trade.  
Better still, as we now know that human 
beings weigh potential costs as much 
more significant than likely gains, some 
way must now be found to put simple 
‘cost’ metrics on the failure of these 
multilateral issues so as to more 
accurately inform developing countries, 
core business stakeholders and public 
opinion.
9 As we argue below, these 
                                                  
7 For example, EU procedural and budgetary 
timetables will almost certainly factor in 
another mid-term review of the CAP before 
2009/10, not to mention a likely new trade 
Commissioner. 
8 For even factoring in a notional realignment 
of personnel from WTO multilateral work, DG 
trade is severely constrained as an institution 
and has been stretched by long-running 
bilaterals with Russia, the GCC and closer to 
home, the Mediterranean region. 
9 This cognitive disparity is called ‘bounded 
rationality’. In fact the most recent assessment The Doha Round and Multilateralism | 3 
costs should not simply factor in a 
comparison with where we were in July, 
or the status quo ante, but any 
additional costs for development of a 
world in which a proliferation of 
regionalism intervenes between now 
and 2010. 
A few technicalities on 
regionalism… 
Of course the ‘orthodox’ economic 
transition is widely understood to 
involve an open external stance for 
small countries, especially if they are 
resource rich and/or labour abundant.
10 
In practice, of course, the issue of how 
precisely any region's economies should 
position themselves to make best use of 
both internal resources and international 
opportunities is a complex one. 
Inappropriate or ill-timed economic 
integration initiatives are not simply 
neutral in their effects. They can in fact 
inflict considerable social and economic 
losses and/or even undermine future 
attempts to adjust policy in the correct 
direction. 
As a starting point, economists have 
long argued that preferential trade 
liberalisation is desirable if the volume 
of imports by member countries from 
the rest of the world does not decline on 
a product-by-product basis after the 
implementation of the agreement 
(Kemp & Wan, 1976; McMillan, 1993).  
The question then becomes: do we have 
the tools and techniques to assess 
whether this is, in fact, the likely 
outcome of any particular proposed 
agreement?  
The answer is ‘yes’. At the very least, a 
simple version of the ‘volume test’ 
mentioned above might be used to 
assess the appropriate level of 
enthusiasm prospective members should 
have for a proposed RTA. But we can 
probably also do much better than this 
nowadays without too much difficulty. 
                                                         
of the benefits of Doha (see Decreux & 
Fontaigné, 2006) places the possible gains 
from Doha as equivalent, for sub-Saharan 
Africa, to a doubling of official development 
aid after 2020.   
10  This ‘ideal’ trade stance is usually 
complemented by (urging) an open position on 
FDI, not simply as a source of substitute 
capital, but more particularly as a vehicle for 
the transfer of technology, knowledge and 
standards of best practice. 
While it used to be the case that serious 
simplicities and shortcomings existed in 
our techniques and tools, fortunately it 
is now the case that substantive 
technical progress in modelling 
database and simulation techniques has 
taken place in recent years.  
We present below just one such idea for 
a practical ex ante test of future EU 
regional trade policy coherence. 
Regionalism & path-
dependency 
Regional trade agreements are 
controversial in economics, not simply 
because of the classic (so-called 
‘Vinerian’) view that they can 
sometimes reduce trade by diverting it, 
rather than creating it, but also because 
of the unresolved disagreements over 
when a regional trade agreement is 
likely to precede, rather than preclude, 
more global agreements. Finally over 
whether, even if global agreements 
eventually take place, the sequencing of 
prior regional agreements has an 
ongoing effect upon the trade patterns 
that emerge. The nub of all these 
arguments is ‘path-dependency’. 
At issue now is how, where and 
importantly how quickly can or should 
the EU move in any re-launch of its 
regional agenda. 
A practical example…  
Given the importance for the EU … as 
from these insights … we argue that 
theoretical contributions from recent 
work on regionalism and the path-
dependency of trade make certain new 
insights available to us (see Edwards, 
2006). 
Amongst other things, forming trade 
blocs between, say, a rich country and 
an intermediate country may not be a 
stepping-stone to liberalisation with 
poorer countries if the latter 
liberalisation is delayed too long and if 
the intermediate countries have veto or 
other voting rights (a case in point is 
Portugal's pressure on the EU to undo 
the textiles liberalisation with China in 
the bra wars dispute).  
 
 
Conclusions: Getting the 
trade policy we need  
It is now important to try to get these 
trade policy priorities right, and not 
simply in an attempt to harmonise the 
transatlantic dialogue.  
Given the present moves to augment 
membership and institutional structure 
of multilateral institutions such as the 
IMF, it is becoming clear that in many 
respects the ability of the EU/US to 
shape debates and policy fora will 
weaken as world wealth, and after it 
geopolitical influence, shifts relentlessly 
eastwards - perhaps more quickly than 
many might imagine. 
So our plea is that the entirety of 
evolving EU trade policy – and not just 
the WTO negotiations – should be 
subject to a clear set of ex ante checks 
as is increasingly found desirable in 
other policy areas. This can be readily 
achieved by an element of simple 
scenario analysis of the likely future 
impact of alternative policy 
prescriptions. But ideally such scenarios 
should also include an assessment of 
increased regionalism as a serious 
potential cost, when viewed in the 
context of the present delay – or even 
ultimate derailment – of a multilateral 
trade round. 
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